University of Baltimore Law Forum
Volume 35
Number 2 Spring 2005

Article 17

2005

Forum Faces: Alexander L. Cummings
Victoria Z. Sulerzyski

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Sulerzyski, Victoria Z. (2005) "Forum Faces: Alexander L. Cummings," University of Baltimore Law Forum: Vol. 35 : No. 2 , Article 17.
Available at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf/vol35/iss2/17

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
University of Baltimore Law Forum by an authorized editor of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more information, please
contact snolan@ubalt.edu.

Recent Developments

WEITZEL v. STATE:
Pre-Arrest Silence in the Presence of a Law Enforcement Officer Is
Inadmissible as Direct Evidence of a Defendant's Guilt

By: McEvan H. Baum
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that a defendant's prearrest silence in the presence of a law enforcement officer is
inadmissible as direct evidence of guilt. Weitzel v. State, 384 Md. 451,
863 A.2d 999 (2004). In so holding, the court overruled its decision in
Key-El v. State, 349 Md. 811, 709 A.2d 1305 (1998), which held that
pre-arrest silence was admissible against a defendant if it satisfied tacit
admission prerequisites. Furthermore, the court held the trial court's
error in admitting evidence of the defendant's pre-arrest silence was
not harmless.
On March 17, 2002, police responded to a 911 call in
Baltimore County. At the scene, they found Mark Weitzel ("Weitzel")
and Thomas Crabtree ("Crabtree") near a severely injured woman
positioned at the bottom of a public stairwell. Weitzel was arrested
after Officer Frederick Johnson ("Johnson") conducted a brief onscene investigation.
Prior to trial in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, the
State gave notice that it planned to introduce Weitzel's silence after
Crabtree told Johnson that Weitzel threw the victim down the stairs, as
a "tacit admission." Weitzel subsequently filed a motion in limine to
preclude the tacit admission. •
During a hearing on Weitzel's motion, Crabtree testified
regarding the events preceding Weitzel's arrest. He stated that earlier
in the afternoon, he observed Weitzel smoking cocaine and drinking
vodka within two hours prior to Johnson's arrival. Crabtree also
testified that he punched Weitzel several times shortly before the
police arrived.
Officer Johnson testified he interviewed Crabtree in Weitzel's
presence, and Weitzel appeared to be conscious and cognizant.
According to Johnson, Weitzel remained silent while Crabtree accused
Weitzel of throwing the woman down the stairs. After Johnson
informed Weitzel that he was under arrest for pushing the victim down
the stairs, Weitzel remained silent but complied with Johnson's order
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to submit to handcuffing. He also maintained his silence when asked
if he understood his Miranda rights, and wanted to make a statement,
though he did provide oral responses to routine booking questions.
At trial, the Circuit Court for Baltimore County allowed
Weitzel's silence to be used against him as tacit admission evidence.
The court found Weitzel was alert and coherent at the time he was
questioned. After trial, Weitzel was convicted of second-degree
assault and received a ten-year sentence. The Court of Special
Appeals affirmed the lower court's decision. The Court of Appeals of
Maryland granted certiorari to consider whether the court erred in
allowing the State to admit Weitzel's silence during the police
investigation as substantive evidence of his guilt.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland first addressed whether
police presence, combined with a defendant's participation in recent
illegal activity separate from the investigated offense, rendered his prearrest silence "too ambiguous to be admissible." Weitzel, 384 Md. at
454, 863 A.2d at 1001. Weitzel argued that his silence was
"inherently ambiguous" because a jury's determination that it was an
admission of guilt could only be speculative since it could have been a
means to hide his recent drug use or the result of head trauma. !d. at
455, 863 A.2d at 1001. Moreover, he contended, even if his silence
were admissible, the circuit court abused its discretion by concluding
that a reasonable person would have responded to Crabtree's
accusations. Id.
The court began its analysis of the issue by discussing its
earlier holding in Key-El v. State. Id. at 456, 863 A.2d at 1001 (citing
Key-El, 349 Md. 811, 709 A.2d 1305 (1998)). In Key-El, the court held
that pre-arrest silence is admissible if it satisfies the prerequisites for a
tacit admission. Id. Since Key-El, many
courts have held such
0
evidence to be inadmissible because it either violates the Fifth
Amendment or is too ambiguous to be probative. Id. at 456, 863 A.2d
at 1002. The court further examined United States v. Hale, 422 U.S.
171 (1975), in which the United States Supreme Court held that a
defendant's silence during an initial police interrogation is
inadmissible as a tacit admission because the ambiguity of such silence
outweighs the probative value in most circumstances. Weitzel, 384
Md. at 457, 863 A.2d at 1002.
In examining the reasoning of other state courts which had held
similarly, the court looked to Ex Parte Marek, 556 So.2d 375, 382
(Ala.1989). Id. at 458-59, 863 A.2d at 1003. In Marek, the Alabama
Supreme Court rejected the notion that an accused individual who
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considers himself innocent will deny an accusation. Id at 459, 863
A.2d at 1003. In rejecting such logic, the Marek court abolished the
tacit admission rule in pre-arrest and post-arrest situations, reasoning
that the accused may have many motives for remaining silent other
than guilt. !d. at 459, 863 A.2d at 1003-04.
Continuing its analysis, the Court of Appeals next looked to
People of NY v. DeGeorge, 73 N.Y.2d 614 (1989), wherein the New
York Court of Appeals held that "pre-arrest silence in the presence of
police officers is inadmissible at trial because silence is the natural
reaction of many people in the presence of law enforcement officers."
!d. at 460, 863 A.2d at 1004. There, the New York Court of Appeals
stated not only does silence lack probative value, but its admission
may also create a substantial risk of prejudice by jurors who are not
sensitive to the myriad of alternative explanations for a defendant's
pretrial silence. !d. Finally, the court looked to Combs v. Coyle, 205
F.3d 269, 283 (2000), wherein the United States Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit held the use of pre-arrest silence as substantive guilt
was "an impermissible burden upon the exercise of the privilege
against self-incrimination." Jd. at 460-61, 863 A.2d at 1004.
The Court of Appeals concluded its analysis by that holding
pre-arrest silence while in the presence of police is not admissible as
substantive evidence of guilt. Jd. 461, 863 A.2d at 1005. The court
reasoned that popular entertainment has given the average American
citizen the perception that any statement made in the presence of
police can be used against one in a court of law. Id. at 461, 863 A.2d
at 1004-05. Therefore, the meaning of one's silence in the presence of
police is ambiguous at best. !d. at 461, 863 A.2d at 1005.
In conclusion, the court discussed the State's claim that the
error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. !d. The court
explained, in order for an error to be harmless, the court must be
convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not influence
the verdict. !d. The court reasoned that because both the victim and
Weitzel had no memory of the incident, and the only direct evidence
presented was Crabtree's testimony, the circumstantial indication of
guilt implied by Weitzel's silence was the only evidence to corroborate
Crabtree's account. !d. at 461-62, 863 A.2d at 1005. The court
broached the possibility that because Crabtree was the only other
individual present at the scene, he would clearly have a motive for
fabricating his testimony. !d. Based on its inability to conclude that
the evidence did not influence the verdict, the court reversed and
remanded the case for a new trial. !d.
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In this case, the court establishes that pre-arrest silence in the
presence of a police officer cannot be admitted as substantive evidence
of guilt. In so holding, the court recognizes that suspects may have a
multitude of reasons for remaining silent. Prosecutors should be
forewarned that introducing evidence of a defendant's pre-arrest
silence could be grounds for reversal, even where such evidence is not
initially precluded by the defendant's motion in limine.
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